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Abstract 
In the philosophy of action, agency manifests the capacity of the agent to act. An 
agent is one who acts voluntarily, consciously and intentionally. This article studies 
the relationship between virtues and agency to learn to what extent agency is 
conceptually and metaphysically dependent on moral or epistemic virtues; whether 
virtue is a necessary condition for action and agency, besides the belief, desire and 
intention? Or are virtues necessary merely for the moral or epistemic character of the 
agent and not his agency? If virtues are constructive elements of personal identity, 
can we say that virtues are necessary for action and agency? If we accept that virtues 
play a role in agency, the principle of “Ought Implies Can” makes us face a new 
challenge; which we will discuss. After explaining the concept of action and agency, 
I will study the relationship between agency and virtues in the field of ethics and 
epistemology. Ultimately, I conclude that not only in theories of virtue but also in 
other ethical theories, virtue is independently necessary for the actualization of 
agency; even if, conceptually, there might not be any relation between the two. In 
many cases, virtue can also have a crucial role in prudential agency. 
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Introduction 
In the philosophy of action, the terms action, agent and agency are bound to 
each other. Thus, the concept and manifestation of agency depends on the 
action that is performed by an agent and an agent is one who acts freely, 
consciously and intentionally.  
An action is an activity with specific characteristics, through which it is 
distinguished from mere happenings or bestial behaviors. In his 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle considers action to be a voluntary activity 
through which the agent attains the ultimate purpose for which he was 
aiming by performing it. After freely choosing the act and inclination for 
performing it, the agent makes an intention1 to perform it. After that, if there 
are no obstacles, he performs that action (Aristotle, NE, Bk 3). The 
voluntariness of action, according to Aristotle, means that the internal causes 
(i.e. desire and belief) result in an act being performed (1111a). We can find 
a detailed definition of an intentional act and agency in contemporary 
analytic philosophy in Anscombe (1957) and Davidson (1963 & 1980).  
If we consider agency to be dependent on action, then a precise 
explanation of agency depends on the acceptability of the theory of action, 
i.e. on a theory regarding belief, desire, intention, practical reasoning, and 
causality. On the other hand, because of the relationship between action and 
the personal identity of the agent, it is notable that our perspective in 
philosophy of mind and ethics also affects our analysis of the concept of 
agency. The neuroscientist reductionist physicalists deny agency by the 
negation of free will and instead speak of a sense of agency2, while 
substantial dualists consider the immaterial soul and its faculties to be the 
agent of mental or external activities and distinguish human behavior from that 
of animals through the activity of the rational faculty. In contrast, Nancey 
Murphy, a non-reductionist physicalist, accepts free will and agency and 
denies that our behavior is caused by “a separate inner agent” (such as atoms 
in reductionists or immaterial soul in dualists); rather, from her point of view: 
Only the person as a whole is an agent. The maps and simulations 
come into play in order to regulate action of the whole 
person (Murphy, 2007, p. 33). 
With the holistic view that she holds regarding human nature3, she considers 
the causality of man’s actions to be a combination of downward and bottom-
up causation and therefore, she is opposed to both the reductionists and the 
 
1. If we say that intention doesn’t reduce to belief and desire.  
2. See for example, Sam Harris, 2012. 
3. For more information about human nature in Murphy, see: Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? 
(2006). 
Agency and Virtues ׀       121 
Cartesian dualists. 
Korsgaard sees agency as dependent on acting on “hypothetical and 
categorical imperatives”. Action is self-constitution, and the principles of 
practical rationality are constitutive principles of action and agency. By 
conforming to these principles we constitute ourselves as unified agents 
(Korsgaard, 2009, p. 25, pp. 213-214; Korsgaarad, 2019, p. 1).  
Sebo (2015) and Aguilar and Buckareff (2015) do not accept agency as a 
distinctive element between humans and animals in the way that 
philosophers of actions define it because all existents can perform actions. 
Aguilar and Buckareff consider rationality as the distinguishing point 
between them and believe that each existent possesses a level of agency in 
harmony with its existential degree and as a result, agency is gradational. 
Man’s rationality is the reason why his agency is more complex and 
maximal (Aguilar and Buckareff, 2015, pp. 30-44) and Sebo also considers 
thinking to be the main element of common agency between man and the 
others with the difference that man possesses propositional agency and 
animals possess perceptual agency. It is because of this that they have 
different moral statuses (Sebo, 2015).  
The present article does not seek to explain theories of action and their 
components or prevailing theories of philosophy of mind; rather, the goal is 
to study the relationship between virtues and agency and to learn to what 
extent agency conceptually and metaphysically is related to moral or 
epistemic virtues. Do virtues have any semantic or metaphysical relation to 
action so that if we consider action as a sign of agency, we can conclude that 
agency cannot be realized without virtues? In other words, are they 
necessary conditions for agency? Is it true that only if a person acts due to 
the possession of moral virtues, moral agency finds meaning? In the same 
way, are epistemic virtues the cause for the actualization of epistemic 
agency? Or is it that virtues are beneficial merely for the moral or epistemic 
character of the agent and not his agency? 
Now if we consider virtues to be constitutive elements of human or personal 
identity, can we also consider agency to be dependent on virtues? This question 
can be raised again if we consider virtues to be from among the basic elements 
of the moral and epistemic character of the agent as it is presented in virtue 
ethics and virtue epistemology (especially in responsibilism1). 
The answers to these questions are largely dependent on our position in 
ethics, epistemology and even philosophy of mind. Therefore, the discussion 
of agency is related to epistemology, ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy 
of action and logic from different perspectives. 
 
1. For studying responsibilism, see for example, Zagzebski, L. 1996; Baehr, J., 2011. 
122  ׀        Journal of Philosophical Theological Research, Vol. 21, No. 3, Autumn 2019, Issue 81 
Among the theories of ethics, virtue ethics considers ethical virtues as a 
basic concept of ethics and the criterion of right action, and instead of 
focusing on the moral act, it focuses on the moral or virtuous agent. Whereas 
utilitarianism and deontologism do not consider virtue to be a condition for 
being a moral agent nor as a criterion for the moral action, Aristotle (2000) 
and neo-Aristotelians like Anscombe (1958), Philippa Foot (2003), Rosalind 
Hursthouse (1999), Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) and Humean virtue ethicist 
Michael Slote (2003), Nietzschean philosopher Christian Swanton (2003) 
and neo-Stoic philosopher and a commentator of Aristotelian views Julia 
Annas (2011), all defend such a position despite their different versions of 
virtue ethics. The moral agent in this theory is the virtuous agent who acts 
appropriately in the circumstances due to possessing moral virtue. 
In virtue epistemology too, epistemic virtue is a basic concept and in both 
its approaches, reliabilism, and responsibilism – particularly responsibilism 
which considers knowledge as a type of activity and attaining beliefs as 
voluntary – epistemic virtue is the condition for the manifestation of 
epistemic agency. Ernest Sosa (1985), John Greco (1993) as reliabilists and 
Linda Zagzebski (1996), Jason Baehr (2006, 2008), James Montmarquet 
(1993), Lorraine Code (1987) as responsibilists are advocates of this view. 
If we accept that virtues play a role in agency, the principle of “Ought 
Implies Can” makes us face a new challenge which we will discuss. In the 
same way that this principle questions the necessary relation between moral 
obligation and the ability of the agent in ethics and in epistemology there is 
discussion regarding the relationship between the ability of the epistemic 
agent in attaining belief and the necessity of believing; so, here too, 
according to this principle, one can ask whether the agent can even possess 
virtues in such a manner that agency is conceptually and metaphysically 
dependent on virtues? On the other hand, can we oblige others to attain 
virtues in order to act and be agents, particularly if agency is considered as 
the distinction between human and non-human beings? 
The present paper strives to define action and determine its formative 
components and then delves into theories of virtue so that by studying the 
capacities of the theory of virtue in ethics and epistemology, it can arrive at 
some probable answers in relation to the question of whether philosophers of 
action allow virtue – as an independent element – to also be necessary 
alongside choice, intention, and desire so that the meaning of action, its 
performance, and agency are all bound to possessing virtue too. 
Ultimately, we conclude that not only in theories of virtue but also in other 
ethical theories, virtue is independently necessary for the actualization of 
agency; although, conceptually, there might not be any relation between the 
two. In many cases, virtue can also have a crucial role in prudential agency. 
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1. Action and Agency 
In the philosophy of action, agency is bound to action (see Schlosser, 2015). 
Aristotle considers human action to be a voluntary activity that an agent 
performs consciously and intentionally (Aristotle, 1111a, 1111b, 1135b, 
1136a). Voluntariness has been defined in two ways: 1. having alternate 
possibilities; 2. the origin of the act lies in the agent. Frankfurt addresses the 
first meaning (2003, pp. 87-88) while Aristotle the second (1111a). Then, 
according to him, the sign of an action being voluntary is that the inner 
causes, i.e., belief and desire result in its actualization. 
The key concept in Davidson’s theory of action is that an act is performed 
intentionally. This is why in the article, “Actions, Reasons and Causes”, he 
considers action to be an activity that the agent performs with reason (belief 
and desire) (1963, pp. 687, 688). And in the article, “Agency”, he considers 
action to be an activity performed intentionally (1980, p. 45). “A man is the 
agent of an act if what he does can be described underan aspect that makes it 
intentional” (Davidson, 1980, p. 46). 
An intentional act in Davidson’s view can be explained in two ways: in 
the first explanation, intention is reduced to belief and desire. As a result, to 
act, an agent does not require any other intention. If the reasons for action 
are the causes of it, then with desire and belief, an act must necessarily be 
performed; and if somewhere an act is not performed, it is because the 
reasons were not the causes for the action. Thus, in the first explanation, an 
intentional act is explained through the causality that belief and desire have 
towards action. Therefore, an intentional act is one in which a person 
believes that x is right and has a desire to perform it. This very belief and 
desire to perform it results in the performance of x rightly. 
 In the second explanation, an intentional act is one which is the effect of 
the intention of the agent. 
Davidson’s view has been criticized in different ways. In keeping with his 
particularist approach, Dancy does not consider belief and desire to be 
reasons for action at all; rather, according to him, it is the characteristics of 
the situations that we find ourselves in that are the reasons for action. For 
example, Mary is suffering and I am the only one who can help her; not that 
“the belief that Mary is suffering” and “the belief that I am the only one who 
can help her.” He does not consider rational beliefs to be motivational at all. 
As a result, in judgment as well as action, he considers conditions to be 
determinant (Dancy, 2004).  
Bratman does not accept explaining intention as belief and desire; and on 
the whole, he replaces intention with plans and the planning of the agent to 
perform an action (Bratman, 1987; Bratman, 1999, p. 110). McCann also 
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does not accept this (2013); but Ridge accepts these words by Davidson 
(Ridge, 1998). Hornsby has criticized Davidson more than anyone else. She 
does not accept a necessary relation between intention and action on one 
hand, because intentions don’t always result in actions (Hornsby, 2004, p. 5); 
and on the other hand, she does not agree with the view that says that as a 
mental state, intention is itself of the category of action and is enough for 
agency (p. 4) (although it is debatable as to whether mental states are actions 
or not). Thirdly, she says that in order to show the causal role of the agent, it 
is not necessary to say that the agent is the cause of an act, because 
according to Hornsby, an agent is not the cause of apparent events but rather 
is the cause of effects and results that are attained through these motions. 
She considers voluntariness as a key element of action. An agent makes an 
intention that to reach a goal, it must act, and attainment of the goal is that an 
action has been performed (pp. 18-20). 
Therefore, in contrast to the definitions that define action based on 
intention, some recognize the will as a characteristic of action; however, 
there are differences among voluntarists as to whether free will itself is the 
cause of action and the agent is considered the cause through his will or that 
the agent directly and through his own will and through reasons that he has, 
is the cause of action or that free will, in general, is a necessary and 
sufficient condition of action without being the cause (Lowe, 2008). 
That which is presently important is that whether or not we accept 
intention or free will to be a necessary condition of action, that which is 
definite is that according to philosophers of action, firstly, agency shows 
itself in intentional or voluntary actions and the agent must have reasons for 
action in order to act; regardless of whether intention can be defined in terms 
of these reasons in some explanations. Secondly, for an action to be realized, 
the reasons for action must also be its causes. Ultimately what is meant by an 
action being voluntary, conscious, and intentional is that the agent must 
possess characteristics like voluntariness and free will so that he is able to 
intend or will that which he freely chose, and does not break his intention till 
the end, so that an action is performed. In other words, the factors that cause 
weakness of will, i.e. violation of resolution (Holton 1999) or failure to intend 
(Mele, 1987; 2010; Davidson, 2001: p. 30; 1980: p. 39) should not exist. 
The question that can be asked here is: Do these characteristics, i.e. 
voluntariness, consciousness, and free will form personal identity; or in a more 
limited way do they form practical identity or arise from it? What relation does 
action have with the identity of the agent? We will ask these same questions 
about the relationship between virtue and agent identity and action. 
Another question that is presented here is: If agency manifests itself in 
intentional actions, which action is a sign of agency, an external act or a 
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mental act? There is no consensus in this regard. What is meant by mental 
actions are activities like to will, to deliberate, to reflect, to intend and other 
similar things and an external action refers to bodily motions. Now if mental 
states like belief, desire and will, etc. are supposed to be a type of activity 
and action, the requisite is that we consider these mental states to be 
voluntary. The question about the voluntariness or involuntariness of having 
belief has engaged contemporary epistemologists as well: Is believing in the 
statement “The sky is blue” voluntary or involuntary? Voluntarists (for 
example, Steup, 2012; Descartes, 1641, Meditaion: 4; Ginet, 1990, pp. 61-
76) believe that a person has voluntary control over his beliefs and as a result 
has a responsibility to believe in “p” and non-voluntarists (for example, 
Alston, 2005; Williams, 1973, pp. 148-149) refute voluntary control and as a 
result, refute epistemic responsibility of the agent regarding belief in “p”.1 
Some consider these mental activities to be actions that, when actualized, 
agency is also realized; actions like to will, to intend, and some believe 
mental states like belief and desire are causes of external action but are not 
themselves action (Davidson, 1971, p. 172). Accordingly, external 
intentional actions are effects of mental states. Some also do not consider the 
existence of mental states for free agency and action because they take a 
reductionist physicalist view of mental causation and deny free will and say 
that “voluntary agency is an illusion; and that willing, or choosing, is 
epiphenomenal” (Runyan, 2014, p. 3). 
2. The Conceptual and Metaphysical Dependency of Agency 
and Virtue 
Four types of relationships can be imagined regarding the agent and virtue; 
semantic, metaphysical, epistemological and motivational. The questions 
related to these four relations are as follows: is virtue necessary in the 
definition of an agent from the perspective of being an agent? Is virtue 
necessary for the realization of agency? Does an agent need virtue to 
recognize moral duties? And finally, can virtue motivate the agent to 
perform actions? The question, in fact, is whether virtue can be considered 
as a necessary element beside will, desire, and intention. In other words, is it 
that as long as the agent does not possess virtue his action is not considered 
as a human action at all? Can virtue be the reason for action? What about 
being a cause for it? Can it be said that virtue is one of the elements that 
 
1. We will observe the effect of these two views on the acceptance or rejection of epistemic 
responsibility. 
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forms human identity; i.e., virtue is the aspect that distinguishes humans 
from non-humans? 
If we divide virtues into two groups of ethical and epistemological, these 
questions come up in both domains; naturally, the advocates of virtue ethics 
and virtue epistemology (apart from the differences), answer positively to 
these questions. But in these views also, one can question whether the agent 
needs virtues to be a good person morally and epistemologically or needs to 
perform a moral or epistemological act? In other words, to what extent is 
agency dependent on these two types of virtues? Moreover, what is the view 
of other moral and epistemological theories in this regard? And finally, apart 
from the moral and epistemological aspects of an act, are virtues necessary 
to perform prudential actions? 
Multiple forms can be conceived for agency to be metaphysically and 
conceptually dependent on virtues: 
1. Virtue is a human characteristic which is the reason for the distinction of 
man from other existents like voluntariness, knowledge, and intention. 
2. Virtue is the sign and cause of the goodness of a person; as a result, it is 
the reason for the distinction of good people (moral or epistemological) 
from the bad. 
3. Virtues are the reason that a person performs actions more easily; i.e. it 
only, in fact, has a motivational and facilitating role. 
4. Virtues result in the definite performance of action when a person chooses to 
do it because they create internal balance, integration, and unity in a person. 
The requisite of the first form is that man's action and agency are both 
dependent on virtue. The fourth form also considers virtue to be indirectly 
necessary for action. The second form only takes a normative and valuative 
view of the agent and even if action is addressed, it still emphasizes the 
goodness of action rather than its metaphysical aspect. And the third form is 
not stating that virtue is a necessary condition for action; rather, it only says 
that it is good and beneficial. However, none of them speak about virtue 
being a sufficient condition; i.e. although it can be necessary, it does not, 
however, play the sole role in agency and goodness. 
The Necessity of Virtue for Agency based on the Principle of 
“Ought Implies Can” 
Before studying the necessity of virtue for agency, we must see whether 
virtue even exists so that possessing it is possible. Do we have a general 
ability to have virtues, so that based on the principle of “ought implies 
ability” we oblige the agent to possess it? 
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Based on the principle of “ought implies can”, we are only obliged to 
perform acts that we have the ability to perform. 
This principle is addressed in both ethics and epistemology (except that in 
epistemology, it means epistemological obligation)1 and had advocates and 
opponents in both aspects2. One explanation of its advocates in meta-ethics 
is as follows:  
If S ought to A at t, then S can A at t. 
According to opponents “ought does not imply ability”, i.e. an agent is 
bound to perform an action at a specific time even if he is unable to perform 
that action at that time. In other words, ability is not a necessary condition of 
obligation. 
In epistemology also, this difference exists as to whether we are obliged to 
have belief. If we accept that belief is voluntary and an epistemic agent can 
acquire belief, the necessary relation is accepted. Voluntarists and non-
voluntarists have different views in this regard. Feldman (2001) and Alston 
(2005) who consider beliefs to be non-voluntary, naturally do not accept the 
necessity and Zagzebski (1996) and Mizrahi (2012) are among those who 
have written papers in approval of this relation. 
If we apply this principle to the present discussion, we can say that having 
virtues for an agent is obligatory only when the person has the ability to 
possess virtues. 
There are some possibilities in this regard to question the existence of 
virtues in various ways and as a result, must be addressed in this discussion; 
they are as follows: 
1. According to contemporary psychological and sociological studies, 
there is no stable and firm state or character trait like virtue. John Doris 
(2005), Christian Miller (2013) and Hartman (2002) hold this view. 
2. If virtues are meant to be stable states of the soul or second nature 
(according to Aristotle's definition) then there is nothing like virtue for those 
who refute the existence of the soul or immateriality of the soul. 
3. If virtues are acquirable and can be acquired through action, according 
to neuroscientists – since they deny libertarian free will – it is not possible to 
acquire virtues through voluntary actions. 
 
1. “The ‘ought’ in (OIC) is the epistemic ought. In this sense, to say that S ought to believe that p is to 
say that S has an epistemic obligation to believe that p. For present purposes, then, “S ought to 
believe that” (Mizrahi, 2012) 
2. Mizrahi, in “Ought does not Imply Can”(2009), and John Martin Fischer in “My Way, Essays on 
Moral Responsibility” ( 2007) have refuted  this principle and some like Vranas, in “I Ought 
therefore I Can” (2007) and Armstrong in “Ought Conversationally Implies Can” (1984) and 
Zimmerman in “The Concept of Moral Obligation” (1996 ), have defended this principle. 
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4. If personal physical or psychological inabilities are an obstacle to acting 
rightly and acquiring virtues, he is not obligated to acquire virtues. 
5. If virtues are supposed to be among the constitutive elements of 
personality, due to the effect of pre-conditions in the formation of 
personality, it is not possible to acquire virtues because we do not choose our 
personalities ourselves. 
Each of these statements must be studied elsewhere; in this paper, we will 
only indicate the last one. 
If we consider virtue to be a constitutive element of personal identity, this 
question once again arises as to whether we do not play any role in forming 
our own personality, i.e. do we choose our own personality and form it 
through our own choice and will or is our personality under the influence of 
external factors not in our control, like genetic, environmental, familial 
factors and is formed in an involuntary and forced manner?  
Here the reply would different based on the three approaches of 
determinism, voluntarism, and compatibilism. If we accept determinism1 it is 
impossible to suppose virtues to be acquirable and as a result, it cannot be 
said that virtue is the condition for action and therefore, it cannot be 
considered a condition for agency.  
According to voluntarism2, since man’s free will is not refuted or limited 
under any conditions, neither in choosing the right action nor in performing 
an action, naturally, man can form his own personality through free action 
and acquiring virtues and one can accept for virtue to be considered the 
condition for action and agency. Compatibilists3, in contrast to these two 
groups, do not see an incompatibility between determinism and free will, and 
even while they accept the influence of internal and external factors like 
inheritance and environment on man’s actions and personality, they do not 
deny man’s free will; therefore, they naturally accept the role of the agent in 
forming his own personality through acquiring virtues and as a result, 
according to them, one can accept that virtue is the condition for action and 
agency.  
There is a difference of opinion regarding the extent to which our 
personality is under our control and a person forms it voluntarily through his 
actions.  
Trianosky believes that a person cannot freely choose his own personality 
 
1. For determinism, see Pereboom (2007) and Moya (2006). 
2. For the voluntarist view, as an example, see Robert Kane (2006). 
3. Compatibilists justify the lack of conflict between determinism and free will in various ways. To 
study more about compatibilists, see for example, Harry Frankfurt (2003), John Martin Fischer 
(2006), and Gary Watson (1975). You can also see Khazaei and Tamadon (2013).  
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and therefore, a person's personality is not under a person's control or choice 
because there are factors and conditions like temperament, environmental 
factors, habits, genetic characteristics, etc. that are out of a person's control 
and affect his personality (Trianosky, 1990, pp. 104-105, 99). Williams also, 
by addressing moral luck, believes that there are factors out of a person's 
control which are in contrast to the control principle (voluntariness) 
(Williams, 1976, p. 116). As a result, luck is a direct or indirect obstacle to 
the formation of personality. Wolf (2007) also denies freedom of will in the 
formation or alteration of personality in another way; however, in contrast, 
Aristotle, Plato, Kant (2002, p. 9), Moody-Adams (1990, p. 111), Jacobs 
(2001), accept the voluntariness of personality. Korsgaard also who states in 
her book that we choose our personality through our actions and intentions 
(2009, p. 19), is an advocate of this view. 
If we accept that agency is bound to human personality, and if it is true 
that we cannot acquire virtues because we do not have free will, it can be 
concluded that virtue cannot play a role in agency and action also cannot be 
virtuous. This view completely agrees with determinism and denies free will 
and therefore, performing actions holds no meaning for it or at least we do not 
have the ability to form the initial personality and we are not considered agents 
at all. But according to voluntarism and compatibilism, through accepting free 
will, virtue can have a role in the realization of action and agency. 
3. Virtue and Action in Ethics and Epistemology 
a. In Virtue Ethics 
Among normative theories, Utilitarianism, Deontology and Virtue Ethics, 
only virtue ethics considers virtues to be the focus and criterion of ethics. 
The other two theories focus on the moral act rather than the moral agent. 
Therefore, they address the criterion of a moral act. John Stuart Mill 
considers a moral act to be one that has the most benefit for the most people; 
according to Kant, an act that is in accordance with moral duties and is 
performed out of respect to moral laws is a moral act. Apparently from the 
definitions, it seems that in the two aforementioned theories, it is not 
important what sort of person the agent is morally and in action too, virtue 
plays no role; as a result, agency has no relation with virtues. 
In virtue ethics, the virtuousness of the agent in relation to the act has 
priority and, therefore, despite the importance of a moral act, it is not the 
focus; rather, moral action is conceptually and metaphysically dependent on 
virtue and the moral character of the agent. As a result, “An action is right if 
it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e. acting in character) 
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do in the circumstances” (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 21). 
However, virtue has been defined in various ways and virtue ethics also 
has different versions. The common aspect between all those definitions and 
these versions is that virtue is a necessary condition for the rightness and the 
performance of a moral act. If this is true, in contrast to how we previously 
defined the agent based on action, here action is defined based on the agent; 
i.e. an action is something that the agent performs not that the agent is 
someone who acts. If we consider the morality of an agent to have 
metaphysically and semantically precedent over the rightness of action, the 
question arises as to whether being a moral agent1 is dependent on the fact 
that a person performs a moral act or vice versa? 
Consider the following states: 
1. If the agent is someone who performs an action, then a moral agent is 
also one who performs a moral act. 
2. If the concept and actualization of agency are dependent on the concept 
and actualization of a voluntary, conscious, and intentional action, then 
it must be concluded that moral agency will also be conceptually and 
metaphysically dependent on the concept and actualization of the moral 
act (voluntary, conscious, intentional and virtuous act). 
3. Being a moral agent is not dependent on the performance of a moral act 
but the morality of an action is dependent on being a moral agent. 
4. The action is morally good if the agent is virtuous.  
5. A moral agent is someone who performs a moral act. 
6. A moral act is one that is performed by a moral agent. 
If virtues are supposed to be necessary for being an agent, the relationship 
between agency and virtue can be conceived in one of the above forms. 
Let us look at the definition of virtue and see how virtue can enter into 
this relation. Aristotle, considers virtue to be a settled, inner state which is 
not of the category of fleeting states, potential and capacity; rather, it is a 
stable and lasting state (1105b, 1106a) which results in inner balance 
(psychological and mental) and causes a virtuous person to recognize a right 
action, control his emotions, gets motivated to perform the right action and 
ultimately, performs the moral act. Based on this definition, performing a 
moral act and moral agency depends on habits that have been attained 
through exercise and repetition, according to Aristotle (1105a). Hursthouse, 
Zagzebski, Foot, MacIntyre are neo-Aristotelians who, despite their 
differences in the definition of virtue, consider virtue to be a settled, inner 
 
1. We will use moral and virtuous to mean the same in all these instances. 
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state or character trait and the actualization of a moral act to be dependent on 
the characteristic of the agent. Zagzebski, who considers moral exemplars to 
be the bases of ethics (2010; 2012), emphasizes the role of the agent more 
than others and defines all moral concepts, including action, as being based 
on the moral agent (Zagzebski, 2012, p. 157; 2010, 2017). As a result, the 
concept and actualization of action depend on the moral agent. 
Slote, who considers virtue as a motivational trait and to mean the agent 
has good motivations, believes that these motivations compel the agent to 
perform the right act. Without this motivation, according to Slote, neither is 
an act moral and nor is the agent (Slote, 2001, p. 4; 2007, p. 710). Therefore, 
moral agency depends on the existence of virtues. In Socrates too, where 
virtue is knowledge (Meno) and necessarily results in action, knowing is 
equal to agency (Protagoras). 
There is no more need to address the definitions of virtue; we will now 
return once again to the previous questions regarding the existence and type 
of relation between agency and virtue to see if virtue is a necessary condition 
for the performance of an action. Is virtue the condition for moral action, or 
of the agent or the condition for being a moral agent or is it not a necessary 
condition at all? 
In virtue ethics, virtue is a necessary condition for the goodness of the agent 
as well a necessary condition for the goodness of action and a moral act is, in 
fact, the very act that a virtuous agent performs. If it is that virtue plays a role 
in agency, it must be the reason as well as the cause of action; i.e. the factors 
that influence the performance of an action and becoming an agent and not 
merely that it is the reason for praising the agent. Virtues can be reasons as 
well as causes of action. Because, due to the emotional factor which is present 
in virtue, it can motivate a person to perform an action and due to the 
integration or balance that it creates in a person, causes a person to definitely 
perform the act; in the same way that Aristotle's virtuous agent acts according 
to his beliefs because of this virtuousness and because he does not have an 
inclination opposing his beliefs. However, an akratic person, because of the 
inclinations that are in contrast with his beliefs or inner temptations that he 
cannot control, cannot perform the right action (Aristotle, book 7). Therefore, 
there is a necessary relation between virtue and action, particularly if we 
accept that virtue forms identity and our actions arise from our identities. 
This relation can be seen in many ways: 
1. If a person helps a poor person; if this help is not due to virtue, not only is 
it not a praiseworthy act, rather, it is as though an act has not been 
performed at all and that person is not known as an agent and agency is 
not actualized. 
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2. If a person does not possess virtue, he cannot help a poor person at all; 
because he will not be motivated to perform the right action. This is when 
we accept that virtues are necessary motivational reasons and the causes 
for actions. 
3. If there is no virtue, the primary agent’s reasons for action are not enough; 
i.e. although desire and belief are necessary; virtue is a completive reason. 
4. Virtues are not factors alongside will, awareness, desire, and intention; 
rather, they are a type of background and strengthening ability for these 
factors; i.e., that if there are no virtues, all of them together are not enough 
for the performance of an action. 
In the fourth state, virtue forms individual identity and causes every person 
to have a particular type of existence. Such a person has particular beliefs, 
desires, and intentions. This type of existence, which has different levels in 
different people, requires that every person's actions be different from others 
in terms of morality, per their existential level; the higher this level, the more 
praiseworthy is the agent and so is his action. This identity shows itself in 
motivational and epistemological domains. With this view, not only are 
moral virtues necessary for the performance of a moral act; rather, they are 
necessary for being an agent.  
b. In Virtue Epistemology  
In virtue epistemology in which epistemic virtues are the basis of 
epistemology, these same discussions are present and the relation between 
epistemic agency and epistemic virtues is discussed; although in the 
approaches of responsibilism, like those of Zagzeski, Baehr, Battaly, who 
consider believing to be a voluntary act, this relation is more perceptible. 
Zagzeski, borrowing the concept of eudaimonia and the definition of right 
action from Hursthouse, and the concept of motivation from Slote, defines 
epistemic virtue thus: 
“A virtue, then, can be defined as a deep and enduring acquired 
excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to 
produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about 
that end” (Zagzebski 1996, p. 137). 
She believes that an epistemic agent is not only responsible for having apt 
beliefs because he attains beliefs; he also has the responsibility to possess 
epistemic virtues. According to her, virtues are character traits that are 
acquired through exercise and like Aristotle's moral virtues, are between two 
extremes. 
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In contrast, Sosa and Greco, with a reliabilist approach, consider virtues to 
be reliable intellectual powers which are a cause for the increase of apt beliefs. 
Despite this difference, both consider virtues to be necessary for acquiring 
knowledge and both believe that knowledge is only acquired when the agent 
possesses epistemic virtues; with the difference that Sosa (in contrast to 
Zagzebski) does not accept virtues to be character traits in his initial works 
(Sosa, 1980; 2007), but in his later works (2015a; 2015b), he accepts agency 
when we pass judgments in reflective knowledge and believes that in order to 
be an epistemic agent, we need virtues like intellectual attentiveness and 
carefulness1. He calls these virtues agential-virtues. 
At any rate, in both theories, agency depends on epistemic virtue and 
according to Zagzebski, acquiring the virtues depends on repeating epistemic 
actions and in Sosa's view, mostly virtues are natural and those that are 
acquirable (like reasoning power) are acquired through practice. Overall, 
virtues are necessary for the concept and actualization of moral agency. 
Therefore, it is not only the characteristics of will, belief, inclination, and 
intention that are the causes for action and virtue too does not merely play a 
crucial role in the attribution of a moral trait to the agent; rather, due to the 
motivational role that they play in the actualization of action, they are also 
necessary for the actualization of agency. 
4. The Fate of Action without Virtue 
If virtue is a necessary condition for action, is it right to say that if an activity 
is performed without virtue, that activity is not an action and that person is 
not an agent? 
Korsgaard mentioned something in this vein regarding an action that is 
not according to moral laws; because, according to her, the value of action is 
that it can form the agent. 
“Action is self-constitution. And what makes actions good or bad is how 
well they constitute you. But since action requires agency, it follows that an 
action that is less successful at constituting its agent is to that extent less of 
an action” (Korsgaard, 2009, p. 25). 
An action must be able to form a unified and integrated agent based on the 
principle of practical reason. According to her, an agent is as follows: 
“The autonomous and efficacious cause of her own movements”... and the 
constitutive principles of action are the categorical and hypothetical 
 
1. Sosa divides virtues into three types: reliable intellectual powers, agential virtues and non- agential 
virtues. The last ones are character traits that help the agent to know but they are not belief-conducive.  
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imperatives” (Korsgaard, 2009, p. 213). According to her, it is “by 
conforming to these principles that... you constitute yourself as an agent” 
(Korsgaard, 2019, p. 1). 
As a result, an act that cannot form an autonomous and efficacious agent 
“falls somewhat short of being an action, and the agent who performs it falls 
somewhat short of being an agent” (Korsgaard, 2019, p. 19). 
Regardless of all the criticisms that have been leveled at Korsgaard's 
theory, this statement by her, as a Kantian philosopher is good. 
Now, can we say the same in virtue ethics, i.e., an action that does not 
conform with practical wisdom or intellectual and moral virtues, is not an 
action at all, or not virtuous? According to Aristotle also, it cannot be 
claimed absolutely that a non-virtuous activity is not an action at all; 
however, it can be claimed that this activity has no value. Because, 
according to him, both virtues and vices have a constitutive role in agency 
and action. One forms a good and praiseworthy person and the other a bad 
and blameworthy one. 
This is why Korsgaard does not accept the relationship between virtues 
and agency. In (2019), she does not accept that virtues must have a 
constitutive role in agency. The definition that she provides for an agent, and 
the role that action has in the formation of individual identity and the 
characteristics that an action must possess according to Kantian perspective, 
guide her in the direction that virtues do not constitute a person; not from the 
perspective that virtues do not constitute actions; rather, from the aspect that 
according to Aristotle, only virtues have not such a characteristic. 
…for Aristotle there is a sense in which a person’s virtues really are 
constitutive of her will… This means that if the virtues are unified, what 
a single virtue term refers to, strictly speaking, is the absence of a vice. 
The vices, unlike the virtues, are not unified and can exist apart… But it 
does not immediately follow that Aristotelian virtues are constitutive 
standards in my sense. For on Aristotle’s conception, a person’s vices 
are also constitutive of her will (Korsgaard, 2019, p. 10). 
 
As it is clear in this passage, Korsgaard, based on Kant's theory, does not 
accept that a vicious person's actions are actions, because such a person does 
not possess internal unity; therefore, he is not an agent at all. 
Aristotle also accepts that virtues are a cause for the integration, i.e. inner 
coherence of a person and as a result, they result in the performance of apt 
action. According to Kant, this balance is acquired through adherence to the 
principles of practical reason and according to Aristotle, through adherence 
to practical wisdom. Therefore, virtue is not a factor separate from other 
factors; rather, in order to create, rectify, preserve and strengthen will, 
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forming beliefs and protecting them and balancing emotions in harmony 
with the intellect, virtues are needed as a necessary factor for forming moral 
personality, performing a moral act and for being an agent. According to 
this, vices are in contrast to virtues in every aspect. Vices result in the 
performance of bad actions, badness of an agent, incorrect understanding, 
bad inclinations, and bad intentions. If we have a valuative view of action 
from the beginning, like Korsgaard's view, Aristotle's theory is faced with a 
problem in this regard. However, if we view the theory of virtue as an 
efficient theory in philosophy of action, it is a more precise theory from this 
respect that a vicious activity is also a type of activity because it has been 
performed with will, intention and even choice; i.e., a person has decided 
from the beginning to perform a wrong act. This statement is one of those 
cases regarding which philosophers of action must decide which person’s 
actions are they discussing and what do they mean by a human being? Are 
they supposed to be theorizing about the actions of people who have the 
ability to perform voluntary, intentional and conscious actions regardless of 
whether they are good or bad?; an existent that has the ability to be good or 
bad?; or only existents that actually possess these characteristics? 1  
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have tried to address some probable relations between virtues 
and agency. We have observed that, according to the theory of virtue, in 
ethics and epistemology, virtues are necessary for moral and epistemic 
agency. However, this does not mean that without virtues, an action is not an 
action. This means that it is true that without virtues, an act is not virtuous or 
moral and its agent is also not moral and in epistemology, he is not an 
epistemic agent; however, considering the moral and epistemological goal, 
since such a person cannot perform his duty correctly, he is therefore not an 
agent in its true sense, not that the person is merely not moral. It is the same 
regarding epistemology. But, at the same time, it is possible that human 
activity as a voluntary and intentional act has taken place. In a general 
meaning and considering the general characteristics of man, a vicious act is 
also action, just as a vicious person too, with this perspective, is a human 
being and not a snail or sea animal! 
What we have said so far is regarding the theory of virtue; however, what 
position does virtue hold in other moral theories? 
 
1. Characteristics, here, refer to free will, consciousness, virtues and vices, and agency.  
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Even though other theories have not mentioned virtue in the definition of 
action, and as a consequence, agency, do not consider virtues to be criteria 
for the rightness of action; however, they cannot refuse the motivational role 
of virtues in performance of moral duties. Similarly, if having free will is 
necessary for agency, even if virtues are not part of the constitutive 
components of agency, they are still necessary for the preservation of will 
because virtues bring about inner balance and this is necessary for agency. 
To be free of vices and possessing different moral virtues is also necessary 
for utilitarians and deontologists to acquire more benefits with the 
motivation of providing more benefit or obeying moral laws with goodwill. 
Moreover, in understanding moral duties too, both epistemic and moral 
virtues are necessary even if we may be among the generalists 
epistemologically.1 
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